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MARITAL RAPE: A HIGHER STANDARD IS IN ORDER
LINDA JACKSON*
Marriage is the only actual bondage known to our law. There
remain no legal slaves, except the mistress of every house.1
... [H]owever brutal a tyrant she may be unfortunately chained
to ... [her husband] can claim from her and enforce the lowest
degradation of a human being, that of being made the instru-
ment of an animal function contrary to her inclinations.2
John Stuart Mill
It is very little to me to have the right to vote, to own property,
etc., if I may not keep my body, and its uses, in my absolute
right. Not one wife in a thousand can do that now.3
Lucy Stone
Women, particularly married women, have advanced a great
deal since the time of John Stuart Mill and Lucy Stone.4 Mill
and Stone's concerns regarding marital rape, however, are jus-
tified even today. Through the late 1970s, husbands enjoyed a
virtually absolute right to rape their wives at will and without
fear of legal recourse. 5 Although our society is moving forward
in this regard, it still has quite a road to travel.6
Marital rape, although not often discussed or confronted, is
the most common form of rape.7 A recent poll found that fourteen
* J.D. 1994, College of William & Mary. B.A. 1987, Amherst College. The author
would like to thank Mark Maguire for his support and assistance.
1. JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 80 (The M.I.T. Press 1970) (1869).
2. Id. at 32.
3. Letter from Lucy Stone to Antoinette Brown (1855), in DIANA E. H. RUSSELL,
RAPE IN MARRIAGE 27 (2d ed. 1990).
4. Since the mid-nineteenth century, women have earned the right to vote, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIX, and have witnessed the adoption of Married Women's Property Acts,
see infra note 29 and accompanying text, as well as the evolution of no-fault divorce laws
that make it easier for either party to "escape" a marriage if desired or necessary,
HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES 1-5 (1988).
5. In 1980 only Oregon, Nebraska, and New Jersey did not have marital rape
exemptions, RUSSELL, supra note 3, at 21, whereas at least 10 states still had absolute
exemptions when the parties were legally married. Id. at app. II.
6. Today 17 states have no marital rape exemption. Most remaining jurisdictions
have adopted some form of the exemption, but others remain silent on the issue. See
infra part I.C. Only the Model Penal Code has retained the absolute marital exemption.
MODEL PENAL CODE SS 213.0(3), 213.1, 213.3, 213.4 (1962).
7. RUSSELL, supra note 3, at xxiii; David Finkelhor & Kersti Yllo, Rape in Marriage:
183
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percent of women polled who have ever been married have been
raped by their husbands,8 and of those women, eighty-five percent
have been raped by their husbands on more than one occasion.9
Additionally, between thirty-four and thirty-seven percent of
women in physically abusive marriages are sexually assaulted by
their husbands. 0
Public perception of marital rape lends some insight into why,
in light of these statistics, most jurisdictions maintain some form
of exemption for spousal rape. One 1982 survey indicated that
only thirty-five percent of the population favors eliminating the
marital rape exemption." In a separate survey conducted in 1986,
when asked "What-should happen to men who force their wives
to have sex?," only twenty percent of the respondents thought
incarceration was appropriate whereas twenty-six percent be-
lieved the husband should not be treated criminally at all.12
Consider, from this data, just what we expect from the women
in our society and why. Consider also that just as our reasons
for supporting or accepting marital exemptions have changed
over time, so have our reasons for opposing a woman's right to
reproductive freedom.13 Are these evolutions in legal and social
reasoning concerning women related? That is, do we truly believe
these rationales or are we searching for rationalizations in which
A Sociological View, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES: CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH
119, 120 (David Finkelhor ed., 1983); Martin D. Schwartz, The Spousal Exemption for
Criminal Rape Prosecution, 7 VT. L. Rav. 33, 43-44 (1982).
8. RUSSELL, supra note 3, at 57.
9. Each of these women were, on average, raped by their husbands more than 13
times. Id. at 67.
10. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 43.
11. Sally F. Waterman, Note, For Better or for Worse: Marital Rape, 15 N. Ky. L.
REv. 611, 634 n.164 (1988) (citing C. Jeffords and R. Dull, Denographic Variations in
Attitudes Towards Marital Rape Immunity, J. MARRIAGE & FAM., 755-62 (1982)).
12. Id. at 685 n.166.
13. Although much of the modern debate surrounding the abortion controversy centers
on the fetus' right to life, this has not always been the case. Until 1821, the United
States followed the common law that allowed unrestricted abortions in the first four to
five months of pregnancy. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 28 (1990). Fear
of "race suicide" was a far more prominent concern than religious or moral sentiment in
the mid-nineteenth century movement against abortion because Protestants were found
to be having abortions at higher rates than Catholics. Id. Another central theme in the
movement was the concern that if women controlled their own reproductive destiny,
traditional sex roles would be threatened. Id. at 33. In a blatant attempt to secure the
social status quo, the American Medical Association Committee on Criminal Abortion
released a report in 1871 that "describe[d] the woman seeking an abortion as 'unmindful
of the course marked out for her by Providence," and viciously pitted husbands against
wives who have abortions. Id.
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we can anchor a fixed social goal or perhaps a preferred social
order.
This Note first explores the historical and modern justifications
for marital rape exemptions as well as the status of state law
regarding these exemptions. Part II discusses a recent Illinois
appellate court decision which struck down Illinois' statutory
marital rape exemptions on constitutional grounds. Part III ap-
plies the rational basis test used by the Illinois appellate court
to other states' exemptions to demonstrate that this standard
does not compel every court to reach Illinois' result. Finally, Part
IV asserts that, despite courts' consistent application of the
rational basis test in this area, strict scrutiny is the appropriate
standard of review because of the exemptions' infringement on
fundamental rights. The Note concludes that marital exemptions,
unable to survive the necessary standards of strict scrutiny, are
unconstitutional.
I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MARITAL EXEMPTIONS FROM RAPE
A. Historical Justifications
The acceptance and development of marital rape exemptions
are rooted in three theories: the theory of "implied consent," the
"unity" and "women as marital property" theories, and the "nar-
row constructionist" theory. Although the implied consent theory
was the initial rationale for American courts' recognition of
marital exemptions,1 the unity/property and constructionist the-
ories provided additional justification for the exemptions' wide-
spread acceptance.
1. The "Implied Consent" Theory
The most frequently cited basis for marital rape exemptions,
both legislatively and judicially, is the common law doctrine of
irrevocable implied consent. The theory of implied consent orig-
inated with a seventeenth century statement by Sir Matthew
Hale' s that a "husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by
himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial
14. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
15. Sir Matthew Hale was Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench from 1671 to
1676. SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, SOME MAKERS OF ENGLISH LAW 135 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1938).
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consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind
unto her husband, which she cannot retract."'6 A woman, upon
entering marriage, impliedly and irrevocably consents to sex on
demand with her husband, at any time and under any circum-
stances.
Hale's legally unsubstantiated theory, previously offered only
in treatise form and never in case law, was first adopted in the
United States, without question or reservation, by the Massachu-
setts courts in 1857.' 7 Ironically, the English courts failed to
adopt the theory of implied consent until 1949.18 In fact, several
justices in the first recorded English opinion to discuss Hale's
theory'9 expressed reluctance to adopt the concept precisely
because there was insufficient authority for the proposition.0 One
justice stated that "[t]here may ... be many cases in which a
wife may lawfully refuse intercourse, and in which, if the husband
imposed it by violence, he might be held guilty of a crime." 2'
Adding to the irony of continued reliance on English common
law for marital exemptions is the 1991 unanimous House of Lords
decision that marital rape exemptions "no longer formD part of
the law of England since a husband and wife are now ... regarded
as equal partners in marriage.12
Reasoning similar to that of the House of Lords is offered by
modern American critics who suggest that even if implied consent
was at one point a valid theory, that time has passed both
sociallyz and logically.24 Additionally, the advent of no-fault di-
16. 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (P.R.
Glazebrook ed., Biddles Ltd. 1971) (1736).
17. Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489 (1857). Defendants argued on
appeal that because the state failed to allege in the indictment that the victim was not
the wife of one of the defendants, their conviction for rape should be overturned. Id at
490-91. The question before the court was not whether being married to the defendant
in fact provided a defense, but whether the state should have included in the indictment
that defendant and victim were unmarried. Id.
18. R. v. Clarke, 2 All E.R. 448 (Assizes 1949) (holding that as a general proposition
of law, a husband cannot be guilty of raping his wife unless a court stated that the wife
was no longer bound to cohabit with her husband).
19. The Queen v. Clarence, 22 Q.B. 23 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1888).
20. Id. at 33 (Wills, J.).
21. Id. at 57 (Field, J.).
22. R. v. R., 3 W.L.R. (H.L. 1991).
23. "Hale's implied consent theory was created at a time when marriages were
irrevocable[,] ... [w]ives were subservient to their husbands, her identity was merged
into his, her property became his property, and she took his name for her own." Warren
v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221, 224 (Ga. 1985) (footnote omitted).
24. The New York Court of Appeals, in one of the most widely cited cases declaring
marital rape exemptions unconstitutional, stated that "[r]ape is not simply a sexual act
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vorce laws, and the inherent recognition that either spouse can
unilaterally withdraw from the marriage contract,2 ensures that
either spouse can unilaterally withdraw consent to marital sex.2
If the victim truly has "revoked" a term of the marriage contract
by refusing sexual intercourse, the proper remedy for the harmed
spouse is in the matrimonial courts, not in "violent or forceful
self-help."27
2. The "Unity" and "Women as Marital Property" Theories
Blackstone best articulated the unity theory when he wrote
that "[b]y marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law:
that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is
suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and
consolidated into [her] husband."28 Once the couple is married
they become one, with the one being the man. The unity theory
stands for the proposition that because the husband and wife are
one, the husband is incapable of raping his wife because he is
incapable of raping himself.
The unity doctrine is a basis for the historical view of women
as the property of marriage. Women are their husbands' chattels
to be "deprived of all civil identity."-9 Early rape laws, which
either explicitly exempted wives from the laws' protection or
were interpreted by their silence to include the English common
law exemption, reflect this notion of women as, property and
to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is a degrading, violent act .... To ever
imply consent to such an act is irrational and absurd." People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567,
573 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985).
25. See JACOB, supra note 4.
26. See State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 45 (N.J. 1981); see also Weishaupt v. Common-
wealth, 315 S.E.2d 847, 854 (Va. 1984) (recognizing a wife's unilateral authority to withdraw
the implied consent to marital sex). Consent was revocable in the English common law
through either a separation agreement or a court order of separation or limited contact.
Id. at 852.
27. Smith, 426 A.2d at 44.
28. I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 430 (Layston Press 1968) (1765) (footnote
omitted).
29. Note, To Have and to Hold- The Marital Rape Ezemption and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (1986). Prior to the enactment of the Married
Women's Property Acts in 1839-1895, much of the English common law was adopted
regarding women and their property rights. John D. Johnston, Jr., Sex and Property: The
Common Law Tradition, the Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality,
47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033, 1057 (1972). Not only was a married woman unable to control
her own real property, but her tangible personalty also became her husband's. Id. at
1045-46. A married woman was also unable to contract, sue, or be sued, and her husband
had claim to any and all of her earnings. Id.
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were intended initially only to protect the property interests of
the woman's husband, if married, or father, if single3
Courts have largely rejected the unity and "women as marital
property" theories by invoking language from Trammel v. United
States,3' which asserts that "[n]owhere in ... modern society ...
is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a
separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition
as a whole human being."32 Critics also challenge the unity theory
on the basis that husbands can be charged with committing other
crimes against their wives.33
3. The "Narrow Constructionist" Theory
English common law defined rape as the unlawful carnal knowl-
edge of a woman against her will.U4 In the narrow constructionist
theory, the term "unlawful," as it is used in rape statutes, means
"not authorized by law. '35 Because marriage sanctions, or au-
thorizes, sexual relations between husband and wife, all carnal
knowledge between husband and wife is lawful, and there are no
sexual relations within a marriage that! are unauthorized or
unlawful. Thus, no sexual relations within a marriage fall within
this definition of rape.5
Supporters of this theory find it superior to Hale's theory of
implied consent not only because it is less likely to become
outdated,37 but also because it alleviates the need to feign consent
where there is none.3 Modern legislatures have dismissed this
30. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 16-30 (1975).
"Rape entered the law through the back door ... as a property crime of man against
man." Id. at 18; see also Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 306, 309
n.22 (1977) (noting several male interests that rape laws originally sought to protect).
31. 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (modifying the rule in Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74
(1958), that barred the testimony of .one spouse against the other if the other spouse so
desired).
32. Id. at 52. For further use of this language, see Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221,
225 (Ga. 1985), and People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (N.Y. 1984).
33. State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 44 (N.J. 1981) (noting that husbands can be charged
with assault and battery).
34. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 60
(1797).
35. ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 156 (2d ed. 1969).
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
38. PERKINS, supra note 35, at 156. Michael Hilf, a proponent of marital rape exemp-
tions, quotes Perkins at length when discussing the development of spousal immunity.
Michael G. Hilf, Marital Privacy and Spousal Rape, 16 NEW ENG. L. REv. 31, 33 (1980).
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argument by drafting statutes that no longer contain the "unlaw-
ful carnal knowledge" language.
B. Modern Justifications
Today, support for marital rape exemptions is grounded in
four rationales that are as a group distinctly more modern, and
thus more easily accepted, than their predecessors: 40 marital
privacy, marital reconciliation, fear of false allegations and diffi-
cult proof requirements, and the belief that rape within marriage
is less severe than rape outside marriage.
1. Marital Privacy
Marital privacy is one of the foremost modern day justifications
for marital rape exemptions. Proponents of the marital privacy
rationale suggest that the right to privacy within one's marriage
is so fundamental that the public, and hence the legal system,
should be precluded from defining or judging the activities therein.
Professor Hilf analogizes marital privacy rights to "drawing a
curtain" around the marriage so the "public stays out" and the
"spouses stay in."41 Keeping the public out, Hilf argues, prevents
voyeurism as well as the embarrassment of disclosing private
lives.4 2
Courts have proposed numerous counterarguments to the mar-
ital privacy theory. The New York court of appeals in People v.
Liberta4 3 rejected the marital privacy argument and stated clearly
that the right recognized in Griswold v. ConnectiCUt44 applies only
"Lord Hale's remarks are not the only, or even the best, explanation of the spousal
immunity," id. at 32 (emphasis added); Hale's explanation is "out of date, and was never
needed," id. at 33 (quoting PERKINS, supra note 35, at 156); "the act of [forced] intercourse
is not rape ... for a better reason," id. (quoting PERKINS, sup'ra note 35, at 156); "the true
reason why the husband ... is not guilty of rape is that such intercourse is not unlawful,"
id. (quoting PERKINS, supra note 35, at 156) (emphasis added).
39. Commonwealth v. Chretien, 417 N.E.2d 1203, 1208-09 (Mass. 1981).
40. "Because the traditional justifications for the marital exemption no longer have
any validity, other arguments have been advanced in its defense." People v. Liberta, 474
N.E.2d 567, 573-74 (N.Y. 1984); see also supra notes 13, 37-39 and accompanying text.
41. Hilf, supra note 38, at 34. Of course, if the sexual act is consensual, neither party
would charge rape and the curtain would remain closed. If the sexual act is non-consensual,
however, Hills curtain would create a fortress.
42. Id.
43. 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y..1984).
44. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut statute forbidding use of contra-
ceptives violated the constitutional right of marital privacy).
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to consensual acts, not to violent sexual assaults .4 Nor is marital
privacy an absolute right. States must balance their interest in
protecting marital privacy against their interest in protecting
individuals' bodily integrity.46 Some courts maintain that the
exemption itself interferes with the marital relationship because
it gives the husband legal control over his wife's bodily integrity
that he otherwise would not have.47
2. Marital Reconciliation
The marital reconciliation rationale for marital rape exemptions
is an extension of the "closed curtain" and marital privacy jus-
tifications. 8 By keeping the spouses "in," and the law and the
public "out," spouses are supposedly forced to resolve their
differences independent of external interference. Reconciliation
theorists maintain that this resolution process, as opposed to one
which allows "access to the criminal justice system for every type
of marital dispute, 49 fosters greater mutual respect between the
parties and eases their ultimate reconciliation.6 Inherent in this
theory is the idea that if a victim of spousal rape is capable of
bringing, and in fact does bring, criminal charges against her
spouse, then the law will have fostered marital discord and
prevented reconciliation. 1
Although the court in People v. Brown52 accepted this reasoning,
most courts and critics reject the reconciliation and marital
harmony theory on the basis that little exists to reconcile if the
relationship has deteriorated to the level of forcible rape. 3 Some
courts and commentators have also noted that the relationship
45. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 574 ("Just as a husband cannot invoke a right 6f marital
privacy to escape liability for beating his wife, he cannot justifiably rape his wife under
the guise of a right to privacy.") (footnote omitted).
46. See Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 518 A.2d 591, 594 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). To
balance in favor of a spousal rape exemption would be "an anachronism in today's
society." Id. at 595.
47. People v. DeStefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 517 (County Ct. 1983).
48. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
49. Hilf, supra note 38, at 34 (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. Note, supra note 30, at 315.
52. 632 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1981) (finding a rational basis to uphold Colorado's marital
rape exemptions); see infra note 133 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574 (N.Y. 1984); Note, supra note 30,
at 315.
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and potential for reconciliation is disrupted by the rape itself,
not the rape charge. 4
3. Evidentiary Concerns and the Fear of Women Lying
Evidentiary concerns are perhaps the most common basis for
the partial or limited marital exemptions found in most current
rape lawsY5 One primary objective of the partial exemptions is
to guard against false accusations made by deceitful or vindictive
women.
Until recently, Lord Hale's infamous warning that rape "is an
accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder
to be defended by the party accused, tho [sic] never so innocent"57
was used as a cautionary jury instruction.8 To guard against
falsely convicting an innocent man, Wigmore advised that
[n~o judge should ever let a sex offense... go to the jury unless
the female complainant's social history and mental makeup have
been examined and testified lo by a qualified physician59....
TheD psychic complexes [of women] are multifarious, distorted
partly by inherent defects, partly by diseased derangements
or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social environment, partly
by temporary physiological or emotional conditions. One form
taken by these complexes is that of contriving false charges of
sexual offenses by men.'
Although these archaic procedural requirements no longer exist
in the realm of stranger or non-stranger rape, the prejudicial
54. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 574; Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d 847, 855 (Va.
1984).
55. See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
56. Id.; see infra note 57.
57. Cynthia A. Wicktom, Focusing on the Offender's Forcefid Conduct: A Proposal for
the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 401 n.18 (1988).
58. Id. The judge instructed the jury to approach the rape victim's testimony with
caution. Id. at 411 n.79. Some jurisdictions still assess the alleged victim's credibility by
her degree of resistance to the attack. See In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1271 (N.J. 1992);
see also Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (holding that
resistance is necessary to prove rape). The measure of credibility noted in Berkowitz Is
ironic considering that victims who resist their rapists are more likely to incur physicar
injury beyond the rape than victims who do not resist. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBO0K OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1990, at 271 tbl.
3.30 (1991).
59. 3A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVEDENCE S 924a, at 737 (James H. Chadbourne ed., rev.
ed. 1970) (1904) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 736 (emphasis added).
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notions supporting them do remain when victims are married to
their assailants6 '
Opponents of this "fear based" justification offer three argu-
ments. First, other crimes exist that are equally difficult to prove
yet they are not decriminalized. 2 Our society instead relies on a
criminal justice system that is sufficiently sophisticated to ensure
that innocent individuals are not frivolously prosecuted or wrongly
convicted. Next is the jurisprudential view that convictions are
not the sole reason for enacting laws. In addition to convicting
criminals, laws serve as deterrents and educational tools, an-
nouncing to society what is morally right and morally wrong,
what is socially acceptable behavior and what is not.64 Finally,
61. For instance, Virginia's current marital rape law requires "serious physical injury"
to corroborate the victim's complaint if the spouses were living together at the time of
the rape. VA. CODE ANN. 5 18.2-61.B (Michie 1988). Virginia's statute is mainly a response
to legislators' fear that married women will otherwise bring false rape charges against
their husbands, motivated either by spite or leverage in divorce proceedings, that would
not only be difficult to disprove but would destroy the husband's reputation in the
process. Interview with Walter S. Felton, Jr.. Administrator of the [Virginia] Common-
wealth's Attorneys Council and Assistant Professor of Law, College of William and Mary,
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, in Williamsburg, Va. (Oct. 21, 1992) [hereinafter Felton].
Professor Felton points out that much of this fear is attributable to the period before
no-fault divorce laws, see JACOB, supra note 4, when individuals falsely created fault
grounds to procure a divorce. Felton, supra.
62. "There is no other crime ... in which all of the victims are denied protection simply
because someone might fabricate a charge; there is no evidence that wives have flooded
the district attorneys with revenge filled trumped-up charges." Warren v. State, 336
S.E.2d 221, 225 (Ga. 1985). The court in Liberta noted that if fear of fabrication determined
whether certain behavior is a crime then all but homicides would go unpunished. People
v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574 (N.Y. 1984).
63. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 574.
64. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 50-51. It is not unheard of for assailants to inquire
about the status of the law prior to committing an act. In Kizer v. Commonwealth, 321
S.E.2d 291 (Va. 1984), the defendant and a friend discussed the Virginia law regarding
marital rape one day before the defendant assaulted his wife. Id. at 293. At the time of
the rape the parties were not formally separated but were living apart due to marital
difficulties. Id. at 292. Although the victim refused defendant's request t9 enter her
apartment that evening, defendant forced his entry by kicking the frame off the door.
Id. at 293. Defendant then carried the victim to the bedroom, ripped off her clothing,
and forcibly raped her, despite her screams, kicks, and scratches. Id. The court held that
because the victim failed to convey to the defendant, in a manifestly objective fashion,
her subjective intent to end the marriage, the victim's implied consent to sexual relations
was not sufficiently revoked and defendant could not be convicted of raping his wife. Id.
at 292-94.
Interestingly, the outcome of Kizer ultimately depended on how well the male per-
petrator understood the female victim's intent to end the marriage. Id. at 294 ("We
cannot say that [the victim's] subjective intent [to end the marriage] was manifested
objectively to the husband .... "). Similar difficulties arise regarding consent when even
the most progressive states ask not whether actual consent was given but whether the
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rape is recognized as a vastly underreported crime.65 Reasons
offered for this phenomenon include the social stigma attached
to victims of rape,66 fear of retaliation, 7 and a reluctance to
endure the double victimization of the judicial system.6 Fabri-
cations of rape charges are unlikely not only for the reasons
stated above, but also because "rape prosecutions are often more
shameful for the victim than the defendant."6 9
4. Marital Rape is Less Harmful than Non-Marital Rape
There is a perception that rape by, a known individual, partic-
ularly an individual with whom the victim has had past voluntary
defendant's belief regarding consent was reasonable. See In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266,
1279 (N.J. 1992). The process of determining consent/intent is particularly problematic
considering the inherent gender differences in communication style. Deborah Tannen,
Professor of Linguistics at Georgetown University, states that "[piretending ... women
and men [communicate] the same hurts women, because the ways they are treated are
based on the norms for men." DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN
AND MEN IN CONVERSATION 16 (1990).
65. A 1990 study entitled "Rape In America: A Report to the Nation," conducted by
the National Victim Center and the Crime Victims Research and Treatment Center at
the Medical University of South Carolina, revealed that only 16% of rapes are reported
to the police. Robert A. Rogers, Study: Rape Numbers Much Higher than Reported, UPI,
May 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. Directors of the Rape in
America study say their numbers differ significantly from those of the Justice Department
because the Justice Department's National Crime Survey is outmoded. Id. The Department
of Justice concludes that 54% of rapes are reported to the police. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS- 1991, at
266 tbl. 3.11 (1992).
66.
[Wihile men ... convinced each other and [women] that women cry rape with
ease and glee, the reality of rape is that victimized women have always been
reluctant to report the crime ... because of the shame of public exposure,
because of that complex double standard that makes a female feel culpable,.
even responsible, for any act of sexual aggression committed against her,
because of possible retribution from the assailant ... and because womenrs]
... accounts are received with a harsh cynicism that forms the first line of
male defense.
BROWNMILLER, supra note 30, at 387.
The Rape in America study attributes underreporting to the fact that 69% of rape
victims "fear being blamed by others for ... causling] the rape." Bob Dart, Study Finds
One in Eight Women Raped.- Estimated Yearly Toll Put at 685,000 Cases, ATLANTA CONST.,
Apr. 24, 1992, at Al. Sixty-seven percent of the victims said they would be more likely
to report the rape if news media were prohibited from disclosing their identity. Id.
67. Twenty-two percent of women raped by nonstrangers and 14% of women raped
by strangers indicated that fear of reprisal was a factor in not reporting the crime.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 58, at 271 tbl. 3.31.
68. Note, supra note 30, at 315 (describing arguments for and against the evidentiary
problems rationale).
69. Id. at 314-15.
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sexual intercourse, is less severe than rape by an unknown
individual. 70 This perception supports both broad marital rape
exemptions and the treatment of marital rape as a lesser sexual
offense.
Contrary to this "less harmful than" theory, victims of spousal
rape suffer greater harm than victims of stranger rape. Data
demonstrates that rape in marriage is actually more emotionally
traumatic than any other kind of rape and carries with it longer
lasting emotional effects. 71 Victims of marital rape also tend to
suffer greater physical harm than victims of non-marital rape7 2
and are in fact often victims of the most brutal and life-threat-
ening rapes.73 Critics of the "less harmful than" theory also argue
that the very existence of rape laws indicates a recognition that
harm caused by rape, any rape, is more severe than harm caused
by assault and should be treated as such.74 In the words of Dr.
David Finkelhor, "[r]ape is traumatic not because it is with
someone you don't know, but because it is with someone you
don't want."",
C. The Cu'rrent State of Marital Rape Exemptions
Seventeen states, through a combination of judicial and legis-
lative means, have completely rejected marital rape exemptions, 76
70. Hilf reasons that because a married person maintains a lesser expectation of
personal autonomy than an unmarried person, the affront to one's personal autonomy is
by definition less in the case of marital rape than non-marital rape. Hill, supra note 38,
at 41.
71. Russell refers to marital rape as "the most dreadful form of rape," as terrifying
and life threatening as stranger rape, yet carrying with it powerful senses of betrayal,
disillusionment, isolation and self-blame. RUSSELL, upra note 3, at 198. Russell's study
finds that 34% of marital rape victims experienced "extreme trauma" whereas 30%
experienced "considerable trauma." Id. Fifty-two percent of the women raped by their
husbands found the assault to have a "great effect" on their lives as compared with 39%
of the women raped by strangers. Id. at 193.
72. Rape crisis centers report that victims of spousal rape are some of the most
seriously injured women they encounter. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 46. Women raped
by nonstrangers have less chance of escaping without further injury than women raped
by strangers. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 58, at 271 tbl. 3.31.
73. See generally RUSSELL, supra note 3, at 273-85 (describing the fact patterns of
prominent marital rape cases).
74. People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 674 (N.Y. 1984).
75. David Finklehor, Ph.D., Address to the New York County Lawyer's Association
3 (May 3, 1984) (transcript on file with the WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.).
76. No marital rape exemptions exist in the following states: Alabama, ALA. CODE S
13A-6-61(a)(1) (1994); Florida, State v. Rider, 449 So. 2d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 458 So. 2d 273, appeal dismissed, 470 U.S. 1075 (1984); Georgia, Warren v. State,
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whereas one state and the District of Columbia are still silent
on the issue." The remaining states have varying forms of ex-
emptions, which for purposes of further analysis are split into
two main categories: "limited exemptions" and "full exemptions
unless spouses are living separate and apart."
1. The Limited Marital Rape Exemption
"Limited exemptions" are perhaps the least restrictive cate-
gory of marital exemptions. These exemptions treat sexual as-
sault between cohabiting married individuals differently than
sexual assault between non-married individuals, but they at least
recognize that rape can occur between individuals living together
as husband and wife.
Limited exemptions from sexual assault statutes include im-
munizing spouses78 from certain types, or degrees, of sexual
336 S.E.2d 221 (Ga. 1985); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. S 35-42-4-1 (Burns 1994); Maine, ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, S 252 (West Supp. 1964) (repealed 1989); Massachusetts,
Commonwealth v. Chretien, 417 N.E.2d 1203 (Mass. 1981); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. SS
45-5-502, -511 (1993) (amended 1991); Nebraska, State v. Willis, 394 N.W.2d 648 (Neb.
1986); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. S 2.C:14-5(b) (West 1982); New Mexico, N.M. STAT.
ANN. S 30-9-11, -12 (Michie' 1994); New York, People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985); North Dakota, NJD. CENT. CODE S 12.1-20-01 (Supp.
1993); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. S 14-27.8 (1993); Texas, TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. S
22.011 (West 1994); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-5-402(2) (Supp. 1994); Vermont, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, S 3252 (Supp. 1994); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. S 940.225(6) (West Supp.
1993).
77. The following jurisdictions' statutes are silent on marital rape exemptions: District
of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. S 22-2801 (1989); Oregon, OR. REy. STAT. S 163.305 (1990).
At least one source, however, indicates that spouses are prosecutable for rape in the
District of Columbia. Letter from the District of Columbia Corporation Counsel to the
National Center on Women and Family Law (June 4, 1984) (on file with National Center
on Women and Family Law).
Although some argue that statutes that are silent regarding marital rape carry with
them a common law exemption, this position has been rejected by several state courts.
See, e.g., State v. Rider, 449 So. 2d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Warren v. State, 336
S.E.2d 221 (Ga. 1985); State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38 (N.J. 1981); see also Dennis Drucker,
The Common Law Does Not Support a Marital Rape Exemption for Forcible Rape, 5
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 181 (1979) (maintaining that the common law no longer supports,
and may never have supported, a marital rape exemption).
Delaware, which no longer specifically exempts spouses from first and second degree
rape, does exempt "voluntary social companions." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, SS 774-775 (1987
& Supp. 1992). The rationale for this provision is that if a victim is a voluntary social
companion, it "reduces confidence in the conclusion of aggression and non-consent, and
seems relevant as well to the degree of injury inflicted and the general dangerousness
of the actor." State v. Hamilton, 501 A.2d 778, 780 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985) (quoting MODEL
PENAL CODE S 213.1 (1962)).
78. Many states still have gender specific rape laws that protect, and penalize, males
only. See, e.g., ALA. CODE S 13A-8-81 (1994).
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assault offenses,79 legislating lighter sentences and/or judicial
discretion to impose substantially lighter sentences, 8° and setting
restrictive reporting requirements.81 Some states limit the con-
ditions under which a marital assault will be defined as rape,8 2
and others require that the victim sustain serious physical in-
juryP Many states exempt individuals from prosecution for all
or some sexual assault charges if they assault a spouse who is
mentally or physically incapacitated.81
79. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. S 13-1407.D (1989 & Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. SS 5-14-
107(a), -109(a) (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE SS 261, 266c (West 1988 & Supp. 1994);
COLO. REV. STAT. S 18-3-403(1)(e) (Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. SS 53a-65(2) to (3), -
67(b) (West 1958 & Supp. 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. SS 707-700(9), -732 to -733 (Supp. 1992);
KAN. STAT. ANN. SS 21-3501, -3517, -3518 (1988 & Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. SS
14:43, :43.1, :43.3 (West Supp. 1994); MD. ANN-' CODE art. 27, 5 464D (1957 & Supp. 1994);
Mo. ANN. STAT. S 566.120(1) (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. SS
2907.02(A)(1), .03, .06, .12(AX1) (Baldwin 1992 & Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, S
1111 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. SS 3121, 3126 (1983 & Supp.
1994); S.C. CODE ANN. S 16-3-658 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. S 22-22-7.4 (Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. S 39-13-507 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. SS 18.2-
61, -67.1, -67.2 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. SS 9A.44.060, .100
(West 1988); W. VA. CODE SS 61-8B-1(6) to (8), -4, -5, -7 to -9 (1992); WYo. STAT. S 6-2-307
(1988).
80. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. S 13-1406.01.B (1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 53a-67(b)
(West Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. SS 18.--61.C to .D, -67.1.C to .D, - 67.2.C to .D, -67.2:1.C
to .D (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1994); W. VA. CODE SS 61-8B-3(b), -6(c) (1992).
For example, if a defendant in Virginia is found guilty in a bench trial of raping his
spouse, the judge may refrain from entering a judgment of guilty, defer all further
proceedings, and place the defendant on probation pending the completion of counseling.
When the defendant completes the counseling, the judge may then dismiss all proceedings
against the defendant. While the court may defer the sentence pending counseling after
a jury has returned a guilty verdict, the judge may not dismiss the criminal charge. VA.
CODE ANN. 5 18.2-61.C to .D (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1994). Professor Felton believes that
besides providing an "out" for the defendant, this provision may be constitutionally
suspect because it unduly encourages a defendant to waive his Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial. Felton, supra note 61.
81. CAL. PENAL CODE S 262(b) (West Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-18(c)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 3128(c) (Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN.
SS 16-3.615(B), -658 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
82. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE S 262 (West Supp. 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. S 510.035
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. S 750.5201 (West 1991); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. S 200.373 (Michie 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 632-A:2.I(h) (Supp. 1993); S.C.
CODE ANN. S 16-3-615(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. SS 39-13-502, -507
(1991 & Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. SS 18.2-61, -67.2:1 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1994).
For instance, although "stranger" rape law requires force or threat of force, marital
rape law requires the use of force. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, S 464D(c) (1957).
83. S.C. CODE ANN. S 16-3-615(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. S 13-13-
507(B) (1991); VA. CODE ANN. SS 18.2-61.B, -67.1.B, -67.2.B (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1994).
Virginia considered requiring "physical injury" instead of "serious physical injury,"
but the legislature wanted to ensure that if a husband was charged, it was "real" rape.
"[The legislature] didn't want someone with just a bruise claiming rape. After all, this
isn't a misdemeanor, it's a felony." Felton, supra note 61.
84. ALASKA STAT. S 11.41.432(a)(2) (1989); CAL. PENAL CODE SS 261(a)(1), 262(a) (West
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2. Full Marital Exemptions Unless Living Separate and
Apart
The "full exemption unless living separate and apart" category
is the broadest category of marital rape exemptions because it
does not recognize sexual assault between married individuals
unless the parties are living separate and apart. States that
require this condition, 5 or offer "living separate and apart" as
one method of allowing the sexual assault charge,86 differ in
terms of how the condition is met. Some states simply require
that the parties do not reside together.Y Other states require
commencement of divorce or separation proceedings,M a written
separation agreement, 89 or a minimum separation period.90 Most
states, however, decline to define what constitutes living separate
and apart and leave the question open to the courts.91
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE: PEOPLE V. M.D.
People v. M.D.9 2 is the most recent case ruling on the consti-
tutionality of a statutory marital rape exemption. At issue was
Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 53-65(2) to (3) (West 1958 & Supp. 1994); HAW. REV.
STAT. SS 707-700, -732(c) (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE S 18-6107 (Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN.
S 709.4.2 (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. SS 21-3501, -3518 (1988 & Supp. 1993); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. S 14:43.A.2 (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 609.349 (West 1987); Mo.
ANN. STAT. SS 566.040, .070, .110(1) (Vernon 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, S 1111.A.2-5
(West 1983 & Supp. 1993); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. S 3121.4 (1983 & Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN.
LAWS S 11-37-2(A) (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. SS 16-3-654(1)(b), -658 (Law. Co-op. 1976 &
Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. S 22-22-7.2 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. S 39-13-507
(1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. SS 9A.44.050(1)(c), .100 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); W. VA.
CODE SS 61-8B-2(b), -6(b) (1992); WYO. STAT. S 6-2-307 (1988).
85. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. S 97-3-99 (Supp. 1993) (providing a full defense to spouses
for all sexual battery crimes unless the couple has separated and lives apart).
86. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-61.B (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1994) (providing that
Virginians can charge their spouse with rape either if they are living separate and apart
when the assault occurred or if the victim has incurred serious physical injury).
87. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 3103 (1983 & Supp. 1994); W. VA. CODE S 61-8B-1(2)
(1992).
88. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 21-3501(3) (1988 & Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT.
14:43.B (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 609.349 (West 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
S 2907.01(L) (Baldwin 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS S 11-37-1 (1956 & Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE
ANN. S 39-13-507(bX1XC) (1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 9.A.44.010(3) (West Supp. 1994).
89. MD. CODE ANN. S 464D(b) (1957); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S 2907.01(L) (Baldwin 1992);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 3103 (1983 & Supp. 1994).
90. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. S 464D(b) (Supp. 1994).
91. See, e.g., ARMZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 13-1401.4 (1989); HAW. REV. STAT. S 707-700
(Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. S 21-3501 (Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 609.349 (West
1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. SS 2907.02(AX1). .12(A)(1) (Baldwin 1992 & Supp. 1993); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, S 1111.A (West 1983 & Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. SS 18.2-61.B,
-67.1.B, -67.2.B (Michie 1988 &,Supp. 1994).
92. 595 N.E.2d 702 (Ill. App. 1992).
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Illinois' scheme of sexual assault statutes which exempts spouses
from prosecution for two of its four categories of assault.3 The
defendant was convicted of a non-exempted sexual assault on his
spouse. He contended that the statutory scheme was unconsti-
tutional because it exempted spouses from certain sex offenses
but not others. 4
A. Facts
At the time of the offense, the parties were married and living
together.9 5 When the defendant, M.D., arrived home the evening
of the attack, his wife, L.D., was already in bed." When L.D.
failed to respond to his inquiry for sex, the defendant accused
L.D. of having an affair.97 He declared that he would wait no
longer for sex and proceeded to punch and choke L.D.98 M.D.
held L.D. down with his forearm, removed her pants and pried
her legs apart.9 9 M.D. then inserted his penis into L.D.'s vagina.1"°
L.D. was able to push M.D. away after ten minutes of forced
93. Illinois had a four tier statute regarding sexual assault:
1) Criminal Sexual Assault: an act of sexual penetration by use of threat or force.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-13(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (amended 1992). Sexual
penetration was defined as "any contact ... between the sex organ of one person and
the sex organ, mouth or anus of another person, or any intrusion ... of any part of the
body of one ... person or object into the sex organ or anus of another person." Para. 12-
12(f).
2) Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault: sexual assault with one or more aggravating
circumstances, para. 12-14(a), i.e.: the accused caused bodily harm to victim, para. 12-
14(a)(2).
3) Criminal Sexual Abuse: an act of sexual conduct by use of threat or force. Para.
12-15(aXl). Sexual conduct is defined as "any intentional or knowing touching or fondling
by the victim or the accused ... of the sex organs, anus or breast of the victim or the
accused ... for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal." Para. 12-12(e).
4) Aggravated Criminal Sexual Abuse: sexual abuse with one or more aggravating
circumstances. Para. 12-16(a).
Paragraph 12-18(c) stated that an individual may not be charged by his or her spouse
with the offenses of criminal sexual abuse, para. 12-15(aX1), or aggravated criminal sexual
abuse, para. 12-16(a). The marital exemption did not apply to criminal sexual assault or
aggravated criminal sexual assault, although spousal victims were required to report the
offense within 30 days. Para. 12-18(c).





99. Id. at 705.
100. Id.
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penetration.10' M.D. followed L.D. into the bathroom and living
room and, angered by L.D.'s response when asked how often
they should have sex,102 M.D. dragged her back to the bedroom. 3
Once in bed, the defendant grabbed a bedpost and threatened
to kill his wife.104 After instructing her to perform oral sex on
him, the defendant once again pried L.D.'s legs apart and inserted
his penis into her vagina.'05 Upon withdrawal, M.D. placed his
weight on top of L.D. and twice jammed his fist 6 and an egg
into her vagina.07 The defendant then pulled L.D. into the shower,
began masturbating, and instructed her to perform oral sex. 08
L.D. called the police while M.D. remained in the bathroom.09
She was bleeding heavily and was later diagnosed with perma-
nent physical injuries.10 A jury convicted M.D. of battery and
aggravated criminal sexual assault."' M.D. appealed his convic-
tion for aggravated sexual assault on the grounds that applying
the marital exemption to only two of the four sexual assault
categories violated the equal protection and due process clauses
of both the United States and Illinois Constitutions." 2
101. Id.
102. L.D. replied that sex once a week was adequate whereas M.D. felt four times a





107. M.D. testified that he intended to stimulate L.D. with the egg, a technique he
witnessed in pornographic films. Id at 707.
108. Id. at 705.
109. I&
110. Id.
111. Id. at 708. M.D. was convicted of the aggravated criminal sexual assault count
which alleged that he jammed his fist in L.D.'s vagina. Id. M.D. was acquitted, however,
of the criminal sexual assault counts involving forced intercourse and the aggravated
criminal sexual assault count involving the jamming of his fist and egg into L.D.'s vagina.
Id. at 708-09.
112. Id. at 708. The court found that M.D. had standing to challenge the constitutionality
of the statutory exemption because the statutory scheme potentially burdened him more
than others who were similarly situated. Id. at 709. M.D. contended it was irrational to
prosecute him for sexual conduct involving penetration of his spouse when individuals
committing acts of sexual conduct against their spouse involving no penetration were not
prosecuted. Id.
To date, defendants have made all the constitutional challenges to marital rape exemp-
tions. See Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); see also Liberta v.
People, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984) (challenging a statute on equal protection grounds);
Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 518 A.2d 591 (Pa. Super. 1986) (challenging a statute on
privacy and equal protection grounds). Victims of marital rape are unlikely to gain
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B. The Court's Analysis
The Illinois Court of Appeals announced early in its decision
that it would only address the constitutionality of the marital
exemption as it applied to forcible sexual assaults.113 The court
also announced that it would apply a rational basis standard of
review to the statutory scheme.'
1. The Rational Basis Test
The rational basis test, or traditional test, is applied to statu-
tory classifications that bring into question neither suspect
classes"15 nor fundamental rights."6 As the Illinois court recog-
nized, states have the power to enact legislation that results in
different treatment for different classes of individuals." 7 The
rational basis test, which affords legislatures great deference in
their legislative efforts and presumes the validity of the classi-
fication, requires only that the statutory classification be ration-
ally related"18 to a legitimate, or constitutionally permissible, state
interest."9
standing to challenge marital exemptions because standing requires a direct nexus
between the injury incurred and relief sought. Thomas K. Clancy, Equal Protection
Considerations of the Spousal Sexual Assault Exclusion, 16 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1, 4 (1980)
(discussing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973)). A victim is not likely to get
relief for her injury, and therefore is not likely to get standing, because due process
considerations preclude prosecuting an individual if that individual had no prior warning
that his conduct could result in criminal liability. Id. at 4-5.
113. M.D., 595 N.E.2d at 709.
114. Id. at 708. Although the court briefly discussed when the rational basis standard
versus the strict scrutiny standard was applicable to questions of equal protection and
due process, the court did not mention why, with the exception of noting defendant's
concession, the statute in question did not warrant a higher level of review. See infra
notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
115. A suspect class is generally based on race or national origin. Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). The Illinois Constitution, unlike the U.S. Constitution,
also considers gender classifications suspect. People v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ill. 1974).
116. A fundamental right is one guaranteed by the Constitution either because it is
enumerated or because the Supreme Court has established the right as fundamental
through substantive due process. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
117. M.D., 595 N.E.2d at 708.
118. For the classification to be "rationally related," it cannot be arbitrary and must
be reasonable. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 515 (1989).
119. The State need not advance its reasons for the statutory classifications. The
burden is on the party challenging the classification to demonstrate that no reasonable
state of facts exist to justify it. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,
179 (1980); Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
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2. The Rational Basis Test and the Illinois Statute
The first step in a rational basis analysis is to identify the
state's interest, or objective, in the statutory classification. Once
the objective is defined, through either legislative history or
judicial precedent, the court must determine whether the enacted
statute is rationally linked to the defined goal. As stated by the
court in M.D., the goal of the Illinois sexual assault statutes is
to "protect individuals from the physical and emotional harm
resulting from sexual assaults and to preserve their personal
bodily integrity."'120 Although Illinois suggested no rationale for
the marital exemptions or their relationship to the overall goal
of the sexual assault statutes, the court analyzed the justifications
most commonly offered for maintaining the marital rape exemp-
tions.
First, the court considered the historic exemption justifications
of implied consent, unity, and women as marital property, 121 and
found that none "ha[d] any place in modern society ' 122 and that
none provided a rational basis for marital exemptions in sexual
assault statutes. 123 The court reasoned that American society is
moving away from doctrines "employed to justify the subjugation
of women in ... law and society,"'' and is instead recognizing
the rights of women, including legal equality. 25 Specifically, the
court adopted the argument in People v. Liberta126 that it is
irrational to imply consent to a sexual assault, that a marriage
license is not a license to forcibly assault one's spouse, and that
married individuals enjoy the same control over their bodily
integrity as do unmarried individuals. 12
Next, the court rejected the modern notion that respect for
marital privacy and furtherance of spousal reconciliation demands
the preservation of marital exemptions. 12 Although the court
agreed that marital privacy, first recognized as a fundamental
120. M.D.. 595 N.E.2d at 709-10.
121. See supra part I.A.
122. M.D., 595 N.E.2d at 710.
123. Id. at 711.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984) (severing the marital rape exemptions from New York's
rape and sodomy statutes). Liberta is frequently cited for its thorough discussion of
marital rape exemptions and its finding that marital exemptions violate the Equal
Protection Clauses of both the United States and New York State Constitutions.
127. M.D., 595 N.E.2d at 711.
128. See supra part I.B.1.
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right in Griswold v. Connecticut,12 is a legitimate state interest,
the court adopted Liberta's reasoning and refused to apply Gris-
wold's privacy right to nonconsensual marital acts.10 In doing so,
the court held that there is no rational relationship between
protecting the right of marital privacy and permitting an indi-
vidual to commit a forcible sexual assault on his or her spouse. 13'
The court renounced the Colorado Supreme Court's determination
in People v. Brown7" 2 that spousal reconciliation and the preser-
vation of family relationships provide a sufficient rational basis
for marital exemptions. 1" The Illinois court declared that it is
not the rape charge but the rape itself that destroys the marital
relationship and chance of reconciliation"I
Equally untenable, the Illinois court contended, is the notion
that marital rape is less severe than rape outside of marriage"35
and that marital rape should therefore be treated as a less serious
offense."36 Relying once more on Liberta, the court asserted that
a sexual assault victim is more severely traumatized when the
129. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
130. M.D., 595 N.E.2d at 711. The court drew a parallel between marital rape and the
Connecticut statute in Griwold which bans contraception by stating that both achieve
their goals "by means having a maximum destructive impact" on the marital relationship.
Id.; see supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
131. Id.
132. 632 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1981).
133. Brown is the only case to date that has upheld the marital exemptions when faced
with the question of their constitutionality. Although the defendant was convicted for
sexually assaulting a woman who was not his wife, his appeal was based on the argument
that the marital exemption, by arbitrarily and irrationally distinguishing between indi-
viduals committing identical acts, violated his due process and equal protection rights.
Brown, 632 P.2d at 1026. Despite the court's conclusion that the defendant lacked standing,
the merits of his claim were addressed using the rational basis standard of review. The
Colorado Supreme Court's reasoning and holding, as it pertains to the constitutionality
of marital rape exemptions, is as follows:
ITjhe marital exception may remove a substantial obstacle to the resumption
of normal marital relations.... The legitimate state interest in encouraging
the preservation of family relationships supports the distinction between
assailants who are married to and living with their victims from those who
are not.
... [T]he marital exception averts difficult emotional issues and problems
of proof inherent in this sensitive area. Otherwise juries would be expected
to fathom the intimate sexual feelings, frustrations, habits, and understand-
ings unique to particular marital relationships.
In light of these considerations, -we conclude that the marital exception
... is neither arbitrary nor irrational.
Brown, 632 P.2d at 1027 (relying solely on Comment, Rape and Battery Between Husband
and Wife, 6 STAN. L. REv. 719 (1954)).
134. M.D., 595 N.E.2d at 711.
135. See supra part I.B.4.
136. M.D., 595 N.E.2d at 712.
MARITAL RAPE
assailant is a spouse rather than a stranger, precisely because of
their once intimate and loving relationship.137 Furthermore, the
fact that rape is recognized as a separate and more severe crime
than ordinary assault confirms its traumatic impact. 1' The dev-
astating impact of rape should be recognized as equally affecting
all victims, married or unmarried. 18 9
Finally, the court rejected the evidentiary and fabricated com-
plaint bases for marital exemptions. 140 The court asserted that
most sexual assault cases in which the victim and assailant have
previously engaged in consensual sex share the same difficulty
concerning the issue of consent.,4' Accordingly, there is no ra-
tional reason for treating married victims of these crimes differ-
ently than unmarried victims. 142 The court also rejected the
argument that a vindictive spouse is more likely than a vindictive
lover to bring false charges of sexual assault and concluded that
neither of these rationales provided a rational basis for the
marital rape exemptions.4 3
S. Illinois' Marital Rape Exemptions Fail the Rational Basis
Test
The Illinois Second District Appellate Court found no legiti-
macy in any of the commonly offered rationales for marital rape
exemptions, and rejected the state's suggestion that the legisla-
ture can tailor statutes without any rational reason for doing
so.' Thus, the court found that the marital exemptions are
completely contrary to the statutory objectives of the sexual
assault statutes. 146 The court declared marital rape exemptions
violative of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
United States and Illinois Constitutions 46 because they do not
contribute to the "protecti[on] [of] people from the physical and
emotional harm resulting from forcible sexual assaults and [the]
preserv[ation] [of] their personal bodily integrity."' 47
137. Id.; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text.
138. M.D.. 595 N.E.2d at 712.
139. Id.
140. Id.; see supra part I.B.3.





146. Id. at 713.
147. Id.
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4. Severing the Marital Exemptions from the Statutory
Scheme
The defendant argued that his conviction must be reversed
because the statutory scheme under which he was convicted was
unconstitutional. 148 The court rejected this argument and ex-
plained that a statute is not unconstitutional in its entirety simply
because it contains an unconstitutional provision.149 A court must
instead look to the legislative intent of the statutory scheme
when determining whether the remaining portion of the enact-
ment is severable from the unconstitutional portion of the enact-
ment.1'0 Given the significant public interest served by the sexual
assault statutes, the court reasoned that the legislature would
prefer to have the statutes without the marital exemptions than
to have no sexual assault statutes at all.'5' The court, accordingly,
"conclude[d] that the invalidity of the marital exemptions ... does
not affect the validity" of the remaining sexual assault statutes.52
Although the ruling expanded the scope of the statutory scheme,
the court maintained that the defendant's due process rights
were not violated by its refusal to reverse the conviction.'1
Because the defendant did not fall within one of the originally
allowable exemptions, the court held that the defendant had
adequate notice that his actions were legally prohibited.', M.D.
was important for striking marital rape exemptions on constitu-
tional grounds, but the court's failure to recognize that marital
exemptions deserve more than a rational basis standard of review
may cause other courts to retain marital exemptions. Marital
exemptions infringe on an individual's fundamental right to pri-
vacy and bodily integrity and therefore require a strict scrutiny
standard of review.
III. Is THE M.D. ANALYSIS THE "RIGHT" ANALYSIS?
Although the Illinois appellate court reached what many would
consider the "right" decision when it applied the rational basis
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court's application of the standard in People v. Brown5' demon-
strates that the result need not always be the same.15 6 The
rational basis test is the lowest, or most deferential, standard of
review courts use when addressing the constitutionality of stat-
utory schemes.157 Each of today's marital exemptions, depending
on the court,'1 could quite possibly survive the rational basis
standard of review.
The rational basis standard of review, the standard applied in
M.D., affords great deference to the legislatures and their stat-
utory schemes. 59 As demonstrated in People v. Brown,60 it is
155. 632 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1981).
156. See supra note 133.
157. See supra part II.B.1. Generally, courts apply one of three levels of scrutiny for
Equal Protection Clause questions: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny.
Distinct from the rational basis test discussed above, courts apply intermediate scrutiny
when the statutory classification is based on gender. Intermediate scrutiny requires that
intentional discrimination against members of the class be substantially, not simply
rationally, related to important, not merely legitimate, government objectives. See Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Strict scrutiny, a standard so high that most statutes
subjected to it are struck down as unconstitutional, is reserved for statutory classifications
affecting either suspect classes of individuals or fundamental constitutional rights. See
supra notes 115-16. Strict scrutiny requires the intentional discrimination against the
suspect class, or infringement on the fundamental right, be necessary to the promotion
of a compelling state interest. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
158. Or, more accurately, "depending on the judge." As of 1991, only 10% of state
supreme court justices were women; as of 1988, slightly fewer than 10% of judges on
state intermediate courts of appeal were women; and in 1985, approximately 3% of state
trial court judges and judges for courts of limited jurisdiction were women. Telephone
Interview with Rae Lovko, National Center for State Courts, Williamsburg, Va. (Feb. 4,
1993). Although the number of women on the lower courts has in all likelihood increased
dramatically since 1985, it is unlikely that the ratio has surpassed 10%. Id.
It is difficult and concededly dangerous to speculate whether an imbalanced represen-
tation of the population has a proportionately imbalanced impact on certain categories of
judicial decision making. Addressing the issue of bias in judicial results, Profegsor Minow
cautions that a judge identifying too closely with an offense is as dangerous as a judge
being too distanced from the offense. Martha Minow, Stripped Dowm Like a Runner or
Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1201, 1206.07 (1992). In the controversial and sensitive area of marital rape, judges
risk being both too close to and too far removed from a case. Specifically, male judges
may be too close to the concerns of the accused and too far from the impact on the
accuser. Using sexual harassment charges as an example of this phenomenon, Professor
Minow states that male adjudicators may "identify with the accused and might worry
about being accused themselves. They might worry about false accusations and the
difficulty of rebutting them. They might worry about true accusations, yet not believe
them serious enough to warrant public sanction." Id. at 1208-09. This is not to say that
female judges are not also subject to bias. See id. at 1208. Nor is it to say that every
judge, male or female, succumbs to whatever biases he or she may possess. The point
here is simply that marital rape exemptions developed within a broader social and legal
context and it is necessary to understand that context when critiquing the origin and
perpetuation of marital rape exemptions. This context includes the fact that the vast
majority of judges reviewing marital rape cases and statutes are male.
159. See supra notes 113, i18-19 and accompanying text.
160. 632 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1981).
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wholly conceivable for i court to find a rational basis for the
most severe marital rape exemptions and the most severe marital
rapes.1'61 The defendant's rational basis burden, restated by the
court in Brown, "is not to persuade th[e] Court that the marital
exception is unwise, but that it is totally lacking in reason.1 62
This is extremely difficult to do and the results can be extremely
court-specific.'6 3
To demonstrate that the M.D. analysis will not always find
marital exemptions unconstitutional, this section applies the stan-
dard used in M.D. to certain categories of exemptions.'6 Because
Brown demonstrates that certain exemptions can withstand the
rational basis test,'65 the standard will be applied only to those
categories that are "more severe" than, or go beyond, the ex-
emption upheld in Brown. By definition, these include only the
exemptions that require, in addition to the parties living separate
and apart, written separation agreements or "in process" divorce
proceedings.' 6
Brown found a legitimate state inteiest in the preservation of
family relationships.'67 A court similar to that in Brown, then,
could also accept the argument that the requirement of written
separation agreements or divorce proceedings, in addition to the
base requirement of living separate and apart, is merely an
extension of Colorado's effort to achieve the same legitimate goal.
The additional requirements merely reflect the state's desire to
expand the base of its reconciliation goals.
Using Brown's language, the exemptions would have to be
arbitrary, irrational, and completely lacking in reason to be
declared unconstitutional. 6 If an accepted state goal is the pres-
ervation of family relationships, and legally tolerating all rapes
within a marriage up to the point when the parties are inten-
tionally living separate and apart is a rational means of achieving
161. See supra note 133. The statute at issue in Brown allowed the prosecution of
spouses for rape only if the parties were "living apart with the intent to live apart,
whether or not under a decree of judicial separation." Brown, 632 P.2d at 1026. This
ruling essentially approves of, or legally permits, any and all rapes within a marriage up
until the point at which the parties have signalled their intent to live separate and apart.
162. Id. at 1027.
163. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
164. See supra part I.C.
165. See supra notes 133, 161.
166. Id.
167. People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1981).
168. Id
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that goal, 6 9 then requiring tangible evidence of the parties' intent
to live separate and apart is hardly arbitrary or irrational.
Although other state interests could be presented in support
of the exemptions and other arguments could be made to explain
how the exemptions promote those interests,170 the point here is
simply to illustrate that all of today's marital exemptions are
indeed capable of withstanding the rational basis standard of
review.
IV. MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTIONS WARRANT STRICT SCRUTINY
Although every court that has ruled on the constitutionality
of a statutory marital rape exemption has applied the rational
basis test,171 strict scrutiny is the necessary standard of review
for such exemptions. Strict scrutiny is warranted not simply
because the rational basis standard yields potentially unjust
results, but because the standards of constitutional analysis re-
quire it.12
A. M.D.'s Failure to Find a Basis for Strict Scrutiny
If a statutory classification -affects either a suspect class or
infringes on an explicit or implicit fundamental right, the stan-
dard of review required is strict scrutiny 73 The Illinois court
must have found neither of these conditions to exist because the
court found no grounds for a higher standard of review than
rational basis. 74 Although one could take issue with the court's
finding that the Illinois marital exemptions do not involve a
suspect class, 75 one must take issue with the finding that the
169. Id. at 1026-27.
170. See supra parts I.A., B.
171. See Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301, 1303 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); see also Brown,
632 P.2d at 1027 (stating that a classification needs only a rational basis when the
legislation does not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right); People v. Liberta,
474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (N.Y. 1984), ceft, denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985) (stating that a statute
that makes a classification based on marital status must be rational).
172. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text. The Pennsylvania Superior Court
has applied strict scrutiny to the constitutional analysis of a marital rape statute.
Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 518 A.2d 591 (Pa. Super. 1986) Ironically, however, the
defendant in Shoemaker did not challenge an exemption but instead challenged a statute
that mriminalized spousal sexual assault. Id. at 593.
173. See supra note 157.
174. People v. M.D., 595 N.E.2d 702, 708 (11. App. Ct. 1992).
175. Although marital rape exemptions specifically affect married women, married
women themselves are not a suspect class. The argument could be made, however, that
19941
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exemptions do not infringe upon a fundamental constitutional
right.
B. Fundamental Privacy Rights Require Strict Scrutiny
Privacy rights, although not specifically enumerated in the
Constitution, have long been recognized as fundamental rights
by the Supreme Court.176 The roots of this privacy right have at
one time or another been found by members of the Court in the
First Amendment,17 the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 178 the
Ninth Amendment,7 9 the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, 80 and
in the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.181 Although
the Court has yet to explicitly recognize an individual's funda-
mental privacy right to grant or deny sexual access to one's
body,182 this right flows naturally from, and is indeed demanded
by, the recognition and reasoning of existing privacy rights1s3
marital exemptions almost exclusively impact women. This argument, in conjunction with
the Illinois Constitution's express recognition that .women are a suspect class, could in
itself warrant heightened scrutiny. See People v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ill. 1974)
(holding that gender is a suspect classification that requires strict scrutiny).
176. The right of privacy, or the guaranteed zones of privacy, includes activities related
to: procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1942) (procreation is one of
the basic civil rights of humanity); marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (the
freedom to marry resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the state);
individual autonomy, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (the constitutionally
protected right of privacy inheres in the individual); and abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 153 (1973) (the right of personal privacy includes a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy).
177. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
178. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350
(1967); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
179. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486.87 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 484-85.
181. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
182. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court refused to extend the protection afforded
fundamental privacy rights to individuals engaging in consensual homosexual acts. 478
U.S. 186, 190 (1986). The right to privacy involved in marital rape exemptions is distinct
from the right sought in Bowers, however, in that it does not claim the unrestricted right
to engage in any chosen sexual activity with any chosen partner. Instead the right
asserted is the freedom to choose not to engage in any sexual activity with any given
partner.
183. Significant to this analysis is history's suggestion that courts read the Constitution
broadly when defining the rights of the people. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 572 (1972) ("In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the
meaning of 'liberty' must be broad indeed."). The Ninth Amendment, which states that
"powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people," was in fact
introduced by James Madison to ensure that the fundamental rights of the people were
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The Court's analysis and philosophy in Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,'" a case involving leg-
islative restrictions on abortion rights, is applicable to the right
to be free from unwanted sexual activity. The Court struck down
the anti-abortion provisions as unconstitutionally restrictive and
concluded by stating that
the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private
sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the
reach of government. That promise extends to women as well
as to men. Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more
properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and au-
tonomy, than a woman's decision ... whether to end her
pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice freely is
fundamental. Any other result ... would protect inadequately
a central part of the sphere of liberty that our law guarantees
equally to all. s53
The fundamental privacy rights associated with the "bodily in-
tegrity" choices to bear children, conceive, or terminate pregnan-
cies are not on a higher plane than the right to choose whether
to engage in sexual intercourse. The decision to engage or not
engage in sexual activity is one of those few decisions that is at
least as personal and intimate, properly private, and basic to
not narrowly limited to those specifically enumerated in the first eight amendments.
Madison stated:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating
particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights
which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by implication,
that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned
into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently insecure.
This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against
the admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may
be guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning
to the last clause of the fourth resolution [the Ninth Amendment].
I ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (J. Gales & W. Seaton eds., 1834), cited in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 489-90 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
184. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
185. Id. at 771-72 (citations omitted). Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, stated
that cases concerning childbearing matters
deal ... with the individual's right to make certain unusually important
decisions that will affect his own ... destiny. The Court has referred to such
decisions as implicating 'basic values,' as being 'fundamental' and as being
dignified by history and tradition. The character of the Court's language in
these cases brings to mind the origins of the American heritage of freedom-
the abiding interest in individual liberty that makes certain state intrusions
on the citizen's right to decide how he will live his own life intolerable.
Id. at 781 n.11.
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individual dignity and autonomy as the decision to end a preg-
nancy.'55
The right to refuse sexual intercourse, in addition to its abor-
tion rights parallels, draws strength from the constitutional pro-
tection afforded by the Court regarding individual decisions in
matters of childbearing. 87 As stated eloquently by the Court in
Eisenstadt v. Baird,'" "[i]f the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual ... to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 1 9 The
Court elaborated by saying that "in a field that by definition
concerns the most intimate of human activities and relationships,
decisions whether to accomplish or to prevent conception are
among the most private and sensitive."'' 1 Matters of childbearing
and decisions about whether to accomplish or prevent conception
plainly include the decision to engage in sexual intercourse, for
without that primary function all other points are moot at best.
It therefore necessarily follows that the decision to engage in
sexual intercourse is one of the several decisions concerning
procreation that are protected by the Constitution as a funda-
mental privacy right.
Finally, the right to refuse involvement in sexual activity is
implicit in an individual's right regarding freedom of association.
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,9' the Court held that the
choice to enter into and maintain certain intimate relationships
is an individual freedom central to our constitutional scheme and
186. If anything, the right to be free from nonconsensual sexual activity is on a higher
plane than the right to terminate a pregnancy. Unlike abortion, the privacy right involved
in the freedom from nonconsensual sexual activity involves no competing right comparable
to that of a fetus.
187. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977).
188. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
189. Id. at 453-54 (citations omitted). In support of this statement, the Court quoted
Justice Brandeis:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of
the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized man.
Id. at 453-54 n.10 (emphasis added) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
190. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685.
191. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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protected as a fundamental element of personal liberty.192 The
Court assigned the Bill of Rights, which was designed to secure
individual liberty, the task of affording certain kinds of highly
personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from
unjustified interference by the State: "Moreover, the constitu-
tional shelter afforded such relationships reflects the realization
that individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from
close ties with others. Protecting these relationships ... safe-
guards the ability independently to define one's identity that is
central to any concept of liberty."'93 Relationships that reflect
intrinsic elements of personal liberty are generally distinguished
by their relative smallness in size, their high degree of selectivity
in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and their seclu-
sion from others in critical aspects of the relationship." The
Court offered the selection of one's spouse as an example of such
an intimate association. 9 5 Presuming, of course, that the freedom
of association includes the freedom not to associate, the choice
not to associate sexually with an individual must, by definition,
fall into the same recognized category of associations as the
selection of one's spouse.
The fundamental privacy right to grant or deny sexual access
to one's body does not expand existing privacy right doctrine
into new territory. Rather, it is an essential element of currently
recognized rights regarding procreation and freedom of associa-
tion. Although some argue that the concerns surrounding marital
rape charges, such as evidentiary standards and false accusations,
preclude the recognition of a married woman's right to privacy
in this area, the question of whether a married woman is pro-
tected by this constitutional right to privacy must be answered
absent consideration of these external concerns. These external
concerns are more appropriately discussed, once the right is
recognized as a fundamental privacy right, in the context of strict
scrutiny analysis.
C. Can the Marital Rape Exemptions Survive Strict Scrutiny?
Strict scrutiny, the standard of review applied to statutory
classifications affecting fundamental rights, is the most demand-
192. Id. at 617-18.
193. Id. at 618-19 (citations omitted).
194. Id. at 620.
195. Id. at 619.
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ing standard of review employed by the courts. 196 This standard
of review requires that the state's infringement on the consti-
tutional right be necessary, or narrowly tailored, to the promotion
of a compelling state interest.' 7
1. Prong 1: Is There a Compelling State Interest in Marital
Rape Exemptions?
A compelling state interest generally is defined as one that
the state is forced or obliged to protect. For the sake of argument,
this analysis assumes that, of the current justifications offered
to support marital rape exemptions, 198 two categories reflect
compelling state interests: 1) the evidentiary interest concerning
false claims and convictions;199 and 2) the safeguarding of the
fundamental right to marital privacy.210
2. Prong 2: Is the Exemption Necessary, or Narrowly
Tailored, to Promoting the State's Compelling Interest?
Limited exemptions essentially allow states to narrow the
application of their sexual assault laws. From an evidentiary
perspective, this narrowed application serves to limit the oppor-
tunity and incentive to file false or questionable charges.
States that define marital rape differently than non-marital
rape do so by including in their definition only those situations
in which rape is most severe and only those procedures that
guard heavily against false claims.201 These states believe, for
instance, that requirements of increased physical injury2 2 or a
restricted period of time in which to file the rape claim 203 make
196. See supra note 157.
197. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
198. See supra part I.B.
199. See supra part I.B.3.
200. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see supra part I.B.1. The state's
interest in promoting marital reconciliation, see supra part I.B.2., is treated, for purposes
of this analysis, as part of the state's interest in safeguarding marital privacy rights.
The state's belief that rape within marriage is less severe than rape outside marriage,
see supra part I.B.4., is discounted for the purposes of this analysis because it is more of
a policy consideration than a state interest supporting the exemption.
201. This grouping combines what was described in the "limited exemption" category
as those that immunize spouses from certain sexual assault offenses, those that limit the
conditions under which a marital, assault will be defined as rape, those that require
restrictive reporting requirements, and those that require physical injury be sustained
by the victim. See supra part I.C.1.
202. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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it easier to prove that a rape actually occurred. Unfortunately,
these requirements also result in victims suffering greater de-
grees of harm, physically and mentally, before the state will
recognize they have been criminally violated. 04 Although these
heightened requirements may make it more obvious that a rape
has occurred, the ultimate question is whether the heightened
requirements are narrowly tailored to the state's stated goal.
Whether a statute is sufficiently tailored to withstand strict
scrutiny depends upon whether less drastic means exist to achieve
the state's otherwise legitimate goals.205 As discussed earlier,
many categories of crimes are in fact difficult to prove.208 The
solution, however, is not to statutorily sanction those crimes, nor
is it to require that a specific group of victims suffer beyond the
general definition of the offense. States are quite capable of
preventing false charges and convictions by utilizing the far less
drastic safeguards of our current judicial system. Prosecutors
will not charge an individual without a fair degree of certainty
that a crime was committed and that the person charged is
responsible; fact finders will not convict an individual without
finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the individual is respon-
sible for the crime.
Exemptions for sexually assaulting spouses who are mentally
or physically incapacitated are treated separately because, in
addition to technically changing a statutory requirement for rape
as applied to married people, these exemptions create another
sub-class of individuals who have no legal recourse against sexual
assault.217 Presumably, the impetus behind these exemptions is
an attempt to heighten evidentiary requirements in situations in
which consent, not the occurrence of sexual activity, is at issue.
Specifically, scenarios involving victims incapable of formulating
or communicating consent or nonconsent may produce inherently
more difficult proof situations.
As with the limited exemptions, however, the solution is not
to statutorily provide consent on the part of the incapacitated
spouse. The state, by doing so, creates nothing more than a
204. See supra notes 61, 83 and accompanying text.
205. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (citations omitted).
206. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. For instance, an individual can be
convicted of homicide even though investigators fail to find a corpse. Government of the
Virgin Islands v. Harris, 938 F.2d 401, 411-15 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that neither the body
of the missing person nor evidence of the method used to produce death is required to
establish the corpus delecti or to sustain a murder conviction).
207. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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sexual repository for the acting spouse. The solution, as with the
limited exemptions, is to rely on the state's ability to achieve its
goals by relying on the strengths of our current judicial system.
Awarding lighter sentences to individuals guilty of raping their
spouses provides neither evidentiary benefit nor assistance in
the prevention of false accusations or convictions. 2 8 This practice
serves only to treat marital rape as a less serious offense than
stranger rape and sends a message to the abuser, the abused,
and society that the physical autonomy and integrity of sexually
assaulted spouses is less valuable than that of other individuals.
Not only does data refute this proposition, 20 9 but the practice
does not warrant the deference of a compelling state interest.210
As noted earlier, the "full exemption unless living apart"
category is a much broader and restrictive set of exemptions
than the limited exemptions. 211 Because state evidentiary inter-
ests do not adequately support the narrower limited exemptions,
they are definitionally incapable of supporting statutes that grant
absolute exemptions up and until the point the parties are living
apart. Evidentiary concerns are also notably lower for rapes
between spouses living apart because they tend, from an eviden-
tiary perspective, to be similar to stranger rape.212 Concluding,
therefore, that the state's compelling evidentiary interest con-
cerning false claims and convictions is insufficient to subordinate
an individual's fundamental right to refuse sexual activity, the
analysis turns now to an examination of the state's interest in
safeguarding marital privacy rights.
Certain rights involving the marital relationship are, in and of
themselves, rights exacting strict judicial scrutiny.21 8 Although
privacy rights as they pertain specifically to marital relationships
have not been greatly expounded upon by the Court,2 4 some
208. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
209. See supra part I.B.4.
210. See supra note 157.
211. See sWpra part I.C.2.
212. See generally Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d 874 (Va. 1984).
213. For example, marital rights include the right to select one's spouse, Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the right to be free from discrimination, Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), and the right of a married couple to use contraceptives,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying
text.
214. The Court stated that although the privacy right in Giswold inhered in the
marital relationship, "the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual
and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual ... Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972).
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argue that these rights shelter activity within the relationship
from outside intrusion.215 Proponents claim that both limited and
full unless living apart marital rape exemptions are necessary to
promote these marital interests.
Exemptions cannot be used to further marital privacy rights
for two reasons. First, as previously established, the fundamental
right of individuals to control their intimate associations includes
the right of a married woman to decline sexual activity with her
spouse.218 To say that marital exemptions are necessary to pro-
mote marital privacy is to subordinate one fundamental right to
another. When faced with a conflict between individual spousal
rights and the rights of the marital relationship, the Court
balances the conflict in favor of the individual.2 17
Secondly, exemptions are neither necessary nor tailored to the
protection of marital privacy rights. These rights apply only to
consensual acts.2 8 If marital privacy rights truly warranted and
required marital rape exemptions, then surely no other crimes
between spouses would be prosecutable. Not only do rape ex-
emptions fail to further the goals of marital privacy, but the
exemptions themselves violate marital privacy by awarding to
one party power he otherwise would not have.219
Neither a state's evidentiary interest nor its interest in marital
privacy is capable, under a strict scrutiny analysis, of outweighing
the privacy rights of married women. This is a just result as
well as a sound result. As stated in Warren v. Statej21 "[s]hort
of homicide, [rape] is the 'ultimate violation of self.'... It is
incredible to think that any state would sanction such behavior[,]
... leav[ing] ... wives with no protection under the law."'221
V. CONCLUSION
Marital rape is a serious crime and a serious social problem.
Rape within marriage is not infrequent and the data indicate
that the injuries resulting from marital rapes, both physical and
emotional, are often more severe than those resulting from
215. See Hilf, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
216. See supra part IV.B.
217. Clancy, supra note 112, at 19-20 (discussing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972), and Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)).
218. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
219. People v. DeStefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506 (County Ct. 1983).
220. 336 S.E.2d 221 (Ga. 1985).
221. 1d& at 155.
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stranger rape.2 Yet more than thirty states continue to restrict
the application of rape laws when the parties involved are hus-
band and wife.P
Most courts that have ruled on the constitutionality of statu-
tory exemptions have struck them down applying the rational
basis standard of review.24 Some courts, however, employing the
same standard, have upheld the exemptions. What is most trou-
blesome about this inconsistency is that none of the courts
examining marital rape exemptions found it necessary to apply
a higher standard of review.P1
By applying rational basis to the sexual assault laws in ques-
tion, these courts failed to recognize that the rape of any indi-
vidual, married or unmarried, is a violation of that individual's
fundamental right to privacy and bodily integrity. Fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution require strict scrutiny. If
this standard is applied correctly and consistently, all marital
rape exemptions necessarily would be found unconstitutional. 26
Although striking these exemptions on constitutional grounds
is essential given the current state of constitutional law, elimi-
nating these exemptions is also necessary from a social policy
perspective. Marital rape exemptions not only fail to protect
married women from one of the worst injuries an individual can
sustain, but the law demeans those women in the process and
subordinates their entire being. Women are human beings, not
the instruments of the animal functions of which John Stuart
Mill speaks,2 nor the defective, deranged prosecutrixes against
whom Wigmore cautions.22 Our courts need to review these
exemptions with the proper constitutional standard so that no
woman is made to choose between the bonds of marriage and
the freedom of self.
222. See supra part I.B.4., notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
223. See supra part I.C.
224. See supra parts lI.A., II.B.1.-3.
225. See supra part I.
226. See supra part IV.
227. See supra note 2.
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